



Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# National Intelligence Daily

*Thursday*  
*12 April 1979*

State Dept. review completed

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
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



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The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section of the *Daily*, will often contain materials that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and Comments.

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
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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

IRAN: Radical Turn


*The Iranian revolution appears to be entering a more radical phase marked by executions of former officials essentially because of their participation in the Shah's regime or acquiescence in its policies. Most previous executions were carried out for specific crimes of violence.*




Ayatollah Khomeini appears to have interpreted the referendum victory for his Islamic Republic as a license to eradicate any vestiges of the Shah's regime. The summary trial and execution of former Prime Minister Hoveyda late last week was followed by the similar liquidation of more than 15 other former government leaders over the past two days.



Prime Minister Bazargan has had little to say about the resumption of executions, but he was quoted in an interview published yesterday as saying he supported the execution of Hoveyda.




Many Iranians--especially members of the middle class--have been shocked by the new executions. They had expected public proceedings when the trials resumed. The continuation of secret trials has been denounced by the opposition National Democratic Front, a small liberal party, which warned on Tuesday that further excesses by the revolutionary committees would result in a government worse than the Shah's regime. Some cabinet ministers also are upset with the situation, and the Minister of Justice has threatened to resign.



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GRENADA: Outside Support

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*The Grenadian Government, which fears a possible  
countercoup by ousted Prime Minister Eric Gairy, has ap-  
pealed for help from Washington, London, Ottawa, and  
Caracas and apparently is already receiving Guyanese  
and perhaps Cuban aid to bolster its forces.*

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
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the Cubana flight that stopped in Grenada Satur-  
day left eight personnel who bypassed immigration con-  
trols. Another Cuban flight is expected this weekend.  
The British representative in Bridgetown states that a  
Cuban vessel with 200 merchant marine cadets is due in  
Grenada soon.

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RHODESIA-ZAMBIA: Another Air Raid

Rhodesian aircraft yesterday attacked a major training base for Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union at Mulungushi, Zambia, where some 5,000 guerrillas are being organized into new, large units by Zambian, and perhaps Cuban, advisers. We do not know the extent of casualties. Two ZAPU command centers were destroyed and a support camp damaged during Tuesday's air raid on ZAPU facilities near Lusaka; casualties were light because most personnel had been dispersed. The guerrillas around Lusaka are very nervous and have fired on at least one civil aircraft--an East German transport ferrying weapons for ZAPU from Angola.

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


USSR: Veto Threat in UN

The USSR continues to threaten to veto any Security Council action that would redeploy UN troops in the Sinai, as called for in the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. The Soviet UN Ambassador has been lobbying Third World delegations with the message that the peacekeeping forces in the Sinai should not perform any monitoring function called for under the treaty. The Soviets resent their exclusion from the Middle East peace process and may anticipate that a UN refusal to support the treaty would open the way to a larger role for Moscow in the Middle East. Moscow may ultimately veto a new mandate for the peacekeeping force because that would force the US to follow through on its commitment to create an alternative multinational force. In Moscow's view, the US would face domestic opposition to stationing its own forces in the Sinai and would have difficulty getting support from other nations. A veto would also be highly popular among most Arab states and elsewhere in the Third World.



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AFGHANISTAN: Prospects for the Insurgents

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*The widespread insurgencies in Afghanistan continue to erode the loyalty of the armed forces--the main prop for President Taraki's regime. Tribal rebels lack the strength and organization to confront the Soviet-supported Army outside their home areas, however, and by themselves have little prospect of overthrowing the government. Unrest in the cities and more settled areas may pose a more difficult problem for the regime.*

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Muslim tribesmen along the Pakistani border took up arms almost immediately after the military coup a year ago that brought the Marxists to power in Kabul. Since then, many additional tribal groups, motivated mainly by religious sentiments, have instigated rebellions in their native areas. A government crackdown last winter against Muslim clergymen critical of the regime gave new impetus to the unrest.

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
The insurgencies seem to be gaining momentum, and the government's authority is now being contested to some degree in nearly every province. Along much of the eastern border with Pakistan, government control is limited to major towns and main roads.

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
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Uncoordinated Rebellions

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There is little cooperation among the various rebel groups operating in Afghanistan's tribal areas.



Coordination is better among the exile groups in Pakistan, but despite an announcement on 11 March that the three most important factions would cooperate, there has been little indication that they are actually working together.

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The tribal rebels alone have little immediate prospect of overthrowing the Taraki government. The tribes can hold their own in the mountains and may even win minor victories against the government, but they have little chance of capturing a major city or waging a successful campaign outside the tribal areas.


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The government was confronted with a different and more threatening challenge in western Afghanistan last month when mobs, aided by personnel from the local military garrison, took over parts of Herat, the country's third largest city. After several days, reinforced government troops regained control of the city, but not the surrounding areas. This appears to have been a largely spontaneous uprising not directly related to the tribal insurgencies.

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In the cities and those rural areas where the government has traditionally maintained control, the people have fewer arms and are more poorly organized than the tribesmen. Popular unrest could again erupt into rioting as it did in Herat, but sustained resistance will depend on the refusal of government troops to oppose the rebels.

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A few organizations--such as the Muslim Brotherhood--may still be able to stage isolated terrorist acts in the cities. [REDACTED]

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Foreign Support

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Foreign backing for the insurgents is limited.

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Pakistan has permitted Afghan exiles, Pakistani religious organizations, and tribesmen to funnel some help to the Afghan tribes. There is little Islamabad could do to prevent Pakistani tribesmen from assisting their Afghan neighbors across the very porous border, and it is not inclined to try. The evidence, however, suggests no significant Pakistani military support for the rebels.

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The new regime in Iran is strongly sympathetic to Afghanistan's dissident Muslim tribesmen but its problems at home prevent it from furnishing significant material help. Iran's main contribution has been moral encouragement to the insurgents. [REDACTED]

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The Afghan Military

Tribal loyalties, religion, heavy casualties, suspicion of Soviet motives, and the slim prospects for an early end to insurgency have already seriously damaged morale in the Afghan Army. Purges of suspected disloyal officers have placed inexperienced men in key positions,

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and desertions occur daily. Some Afghan units reportedly have fled or surrendered after only token resistance.

The government is taking steps to limit the impact of these losses. The Army is retaining soldiers beyond their obligatory terms of service and may have begun recalling individuals released from active duty. The Army also is using tribal irregulars to fight other tribes opposing the government. Kabul is undertaking a longer term program to improve command and control in the eastern provinces and to expand the Army as a whole. None of these measures, however, will have any immediate impact on the military's ability to cope with the insurgency.

The pressure on the military could eventually become so severe that officers who now appear loyal would advocate the overthrow of the Marxist regime. Both Kabul and Moscow are attempting to meet this danger. Further purges, more Soviet advisers and arms, strengthening the Army, and gestures such as the recent appointment of a popular officer as Defense Minister may help. At the same time, these remedies could intensify the problems in the military by increasing distrust of Soviet intentions, forcing the government to rely even more on inexperienced officers, and further revealing the government's weakness.

#### Soviet Support

Even before Taraki came to power last year, the USSR was Afghanistan's major source of economic aid and almost the sole source of military assistance. Since then, the Soviet role has grown significantly.


Greater Soviet involvement is likely. Soviet assistance is needed to improve the military logistic system and increase mobility of its forces. Soviet personnel


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


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
could also become more involved in the fighting in the hinterlands without seriously risking an adverse foreign reaction to their role. 

The Soviets currently are taking pains to conceal the extent of their involvement, and it is unclear how far they are prepared to go to save the present government. The current visit to Afghanistan by the USSR's ranking political-military general suggests that Moscow wants a close reading of the reliability and capability of Afghan armed forces before deciding on its next steps. 



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#### OVERNIGHT REPORTS


(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the intelligence community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)




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#### Egypt

During his speech yesterday, President Sadat called for a national referendum on 19 April to approve the peace treaty with Israel and to endorse the dissolution of Egypt's Parliament, with general elections to be held within 60 days. Egyptian voters also will be asked to approve a constitutional amendment governing the formation of political parties and to support a declaration of human rights for the Egyptian people. Sadat promised to form a consultative or "family" council but gave no details.



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


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